Blog Doha Moscow Peace peace talks Taleban War & Peace

Before Doha 7: Afghanistan peace efforts recovering from a lull?

Afghan politicians from Kabul (to the left of Russian overseas minister Sergey Lavrov) and the Taleban (to his right) at a ceremonial meeting devoted to the 100th anniversary of Russian-Afghan diplomatic relations in Moscow, 28 Might 2019.

The seventh spherical of United States-Taleban talks in Doha is imminent. But US-Taleban negotiations in Doha for a negotiated answer to the Afghan warfare have been stalling in current rounds, after some preliminary progress. Thus far additionally they still exclude the third key actor, the Afghan authorities. Parties within the so-called intra-Afghan dialogue have also been treading water; up to now they have been hosted by the Russian authorities but ought to now continue in Doha, too. AAN’s Thomas Ruttig seems at what has been achieved up to now, the obstacles, including vital gaps between the US and Taleban positions, that also stand in the best way of a complete peace agreement and latest US makes an attempt to insert a new dynamic into the Doha talks.

The US-Taleban Doha talks have seen six rounds between October 2018 and Might 2019. After elements of an settlement have been reached upon “in principle“ in January 2019, as US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo described it during his short visit to Afghanistan on 25 June 2019, the parties did not make much more progress in the last two rounds, held from 25 February to 12 March, and 1 to 9 May 2019, however. US Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad explained that this was normal, as now “the nitty-gritty” was being debated and “

The Taleban are more upbeat about what the talks have achieved to date. However they refer more to process than substance. After the previous, sixth round, their spokesman referred to as them “positive and constructive,” claiming there had been “some progress” and that “[b]oth sides listened to each other with care and patience.” He added that earlier than the subsequent round, both events would consult their respective leaders and “discuss the remaining points in the next round of talks.”

This is not shocking. The Taleban are having fun with their rising worldwide attention and new-found status as a recognised negotiating associate with the US and with different governments. Most lately, Taleban delegations visited China and probably Iran once more.

Somewhat equally to Doha, the newest intra-Afghan dialogue assembly in Moscow in late Might 2019 introduced no progress, no less than for those Afghan members attending from Kabul. They have been disillusioned by the Taleban’s rejection of a proposed ceasefire over the three days of Eid al-Fitr in early June (media report here).

Nevertheless, there appears to have been an undeclared ceasefire by the Taleban in most elements of the nation over those three days. AAN acquired reviews from Ghazni province, for instance, that the Taleban management had instructed their fighters to halt assaults for that point, and certainly no attacks from their aspect have been observed countrywide through the holidays. This was in stark distinction to the spike of violence and civilian hurt over the holy month of Ramadan, as reported by the United Nations, throughout which the Taleban rejected calls for a cessation of attacks. As an unannounced ceasefire, it didn’t have the encouraging impression of the 2018 Eid ceasefire that was introduced and observed by all sides (see our reporting on it right here, here, here and right here). (1)

The failure to include more ladies and other representatives of civil society in the intra-Afghan dialogue (AAN analysis right here) has been another supply of disappointment. The massive groups from Kabul that attended the last two Moscow meetings in February and Might 2019 had solely two ladies each time (ex-MP Fauzia Kufi, both occasions, Hawa Alam Nuristani, now head of the Unbiased Election Commission, through the first assembly, and former deputy ladies’s affairs minister Tajwar Kakar throughout the second one; an earlier AAN analysis right here). Members attending from Kabul, mainly leading male politicians, have been invited on a person basis, however it seems they did not insist on growing the women’s share.

The Taleban did not embrace ladies in their delegation, despite a Reuters report claiming this might happen. A Taleban spokesman later clarified over Twitter: “There will not be any women present in our team at intra-Afghan conference” as it was “not necessary”.

Doha: Some objective posts set…

In contrast to the Taleban’s statement that the subsequent round would just talk about some “remaining points,” there are nonetheless more factors of discord than settlement. Within the US-Taleban talks in Doha, four points have been on the agenda from the start, as confirmed by US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad. He stated they might come collectively in “a comprehensive peace agreement (…) made up of four inter-connected parts” (see his tweet right here):

  • counter-terrorism assurances [by the Taleban]
  • troop withdrawal [by the US]
  • intra-Afghan negotiations that result in a political settlement
  • a complete & everlasting ceasefire

Khalilzad reiterated that he had “said on numerous occasions [that] nothing [of the above] is agreed until everything is agreed.” In other phrases, there might be no separate official agreements on any of the 4 particular person points, however, if all goes nicely, finalised drafts on a number of points will later be a part of a remaining, comprehensive agreement.

Up to spherical 4 of the Doha talks that led to late January 2019, both parties had set some aim posts, as Khalilzad then advised the New York Occasions: “We have a draft of the framework that has to be fleshed out before it becomes an agreement” (see here and here).

Most progress has been made on getting counter-terrorism assurances from the Taleban, and on the withdrawal of the overseas forces. The US have made clear they’re prepared to do so, pending agreement on a ceasefire and intra-Afghan negotiations. Pompeo now said that these negotiations “will allow Afghans to fashion a political settlement and determine the future for their country.” It nonetheless does not explicitly say that these negotiations must be efficiently concluded before a remaining settlement with the Taleban.

Till very just lately, the US had also by no means said officially that they might pull out all their forces. As an alternative, this came from the Taleban, as their negotiating staff spokesman, Suhail Shahin, stated in mid-June: “America has agreed during the negotiations that they will withdraw all their troops.” Pompeo now also confirmed that the US was ready for a full withdrawal: “We’ve made clear to the Taliban that we’re prepared to remove our forces.” He stated that was condition-based, a trace at the mandatory sequencing between all 4 ‘interconnected’ elements beneath dialogue in Doha.

… but in addition gaps remain

  1. a) The agenda

Khalilzad has additionally just lately claimed that the 4 factors and the “nothing is agreed…” formulation was “the framework which the Taliban accept.” Nevertheless, the Taleban had complained as early as mid-January 2019 (their assertion quoted right here) that the US was “backing away from the agenda,” which, in accordance with them, consisted of solely two issues: “the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan and preventing Afghanistan from being used against other countries.” They accused the US of “unilaterally adding new subjects.” This seems to discuss with reported US demands for a six-month ceasefire made in a aspect meeting held in Abu Dhabi in mid-December 2018 (media report here). Such a truce would have coated the whole spring when the Taleban often announce their annual (‘spring’) offensive and intensify operations. The Taleban have been apparently not ready to dispense with this implies of exerting army strain while negotiating. There was also a heated trade when, in Might 2019, Khalilzad asked the Taleban “to lay down their arms.” Taleban chief Hebatullah Akhunzada repeated in his current Eid message that “no one should expect us to pour cold water on the heated battlefronts of Jihad” (quoted right here).

The March 2019 round was adopted by mutual accusations exchanged over Twitter that the opposite aspect was appearing “against peace” (see media report right here).

More just lately, a few days earlier than the seventh round in Doha, “Taleban sources” – although not their spokesmen – have been quoted by Reuters that “A ceasefire and intra-Afghan talks will not be discussed during the seventh round.” However this can be political sniping by spoilers.

  1. b) withdrawal

Whereas Pompeo now confirmed the US’ readiness for a withdrawal, he also clarified that there isn’t a agreed withdrawal timeframe or sequencing yet, simply an agreement that there needs to be a timeframe. He stated, “I want to be clear, we’ve not yet agreed on a timeline to do so.” This might be one topic of the approaching Doha round.

Some ideas concerning the timeframe have transpired. For example, the Brookings Institute reported that each side’ concepts differ extensively, from a “few months as the Taliban wants [… to] between 16 to 24 months as the United States seeks.” The New York Occasions even reported in February 2019 that the US was envisaging a five yr period. Khalilzad and NATO Secretary Basic Jens Stoltenberg confirmed in early June that the sequencing would happen collectively with NATO and different allies.

The Taleban, in contrast, demand that the US announce a timeline first and begin their withdrawal whereas negotiations concerning the remaining issues are on-going. Reuters quoted Shahin saying on 24 June 2019:

As soon as the timetable for overseas drive withdrawal is introduced, then talks will routinely enter the subsequent stage. We don’t need to attend for the completion of the withdrawal, both withdrawal and talks can move ahead simultaneously.

  1. c) Anti-terrorism ensures

The 25 April 2019 US-Chinese-Russian statement quoted above also reflected what kind of guarantees the Taleban have given the US:

The three sides (…) pay attention to the Afghan Taliban’s commitment to: battle ISIS and reduce ties with Al-Qaeda, [the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement], and other worldwide terrorist teams; ensure the areas they management won’t be used to threaten another nation; and call on them to stop terrorist recruiting, coaching, and fundraising, and expel any recognized terrorists.

US Secretary of State Pompeo added, when in Kabul on 25 June 2019, that the Taleban would “be a part of fellow Afghans“ in this effort.

An extra question is whether or not the Taleban, within the US view, would wish to distance themselves explicitly and publicly from those and the others among the “20 terrorist groups” that, in line with the Afghan government, function on Afghan soil. (2) Normally, there must be no drawback with the local IS department, referred to as the Islamic State – Khorasan Province, which the Taleban think about an unwanted competitor in Afghanistan. They’ve been – relatively successfully – preventing the group from its first look in the country in 2014 (background right here); see also their current anti-ISKP offensive in Kunar province that has been on-going since April 2019.

Distancing themselves from al-Qaeda is perhaps extra difficult for the Taleban. Some of those who later arrange this group, notably Osama bin Laden, fought on the identical aspect as the later Taleban leaders (then still in the ranks of varied mujahedin teams) towards the 1980s Soviet occupation, and some in the Taleban nonetheless recognize them for that position. This was also the rationale why the late Taleban chief Mullah Muhammad Omar refused to extradite bin Laden even after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. To distance themselves from al-Qaeda may additionally not look good in the eyes of some Taleban’s non-state sponsors. Then again, the relation between the ‘Islamist-nationalist’, Hanafi Sunni Taleban and ‘Islamist-internationalist’, Salafi al-Qaeda was all the time strained, notably after al-Qaeda carried out the 9/11 assaults triggering the US-led response that ended their rule in Afghanistan. (Alex Strick van Linschoten & Felix Kuehn’s seminal 2011 ebook An Enemy We Created: The Fantasy of the Taliban–Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970–2010 has all of the detail.) Any sort of post-agreement cooperation with al-Qaeda or comparable groups would hamper their strategic political goal of regaining power within the nation, as it will draw renewed outdoors attention to Afghanistan – an attention that may in any other case wane after a peace agreement, giving the Taleban freedom of motion to implement their home goals with much less scrutiny than presently exists. The Taleban are also not financially or militarily dependent on the much-reduced al-Qaeda.

The Taleban may be a lot much less concerned about groups that operate beneath their umbrella as do some remnants of the Islamic Motion of Uzbekistan (IMU) or Jundullah (see in these AAN analyses, right here and right here). With regard to the fighters of these groups, numbering some a whole lot at greatest in all instances and largely incapable of working with out Taleban help or green mild, the Taleban have a number of options. They might let them quietly slip throughout some border. But this might alarm Russia and the Central Asian republics, China and Pakistan, and create new, unwanted regional tensions. To detain and even hand over fellow Muslims to the US or their nations of origin, and even more so on behalf of the previous arch-enemy, wouldn’t look good both in the eyes of donors and probably even their very own fighters. It will be easier for the Taleban if these groups might be included in a common Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration process which has to take place anyway after an settlement, and would possible additionally embrace decommissioned Taleban fighters and members of Afghan authorities forces, together with pro-government militias. This may permit them to be absorbed into Afghan society, with guarantees that they don’t return to the battlefield. (In fact, there would must be a reliable mechanism to watch them.) It’s recognized that a variety of Arabs and Central Asians, notably those that have been in Afghanistan for a very long time, have integrated and even married into native communities.

Harder for the Taleban will probably be dealing with the Pakistani teams that – just like ISKP – use staging areas in japanese Afghanistan but are primarily focussed on operations of their house country. These areas are neither absolutely managed by the Afghan government nor the Taleban. Right here, cooperation with Pakistan can be key.

There’s also the difficulty of overseas safety detainees in Afghan jails the variety of which is unknown. When the US handed over their detention amenities to the Afghan authorities in 2014, there were only a handful left (see AAN evaluation here). However new ones have been captured; there are frequent reviews about primarily Pakistani fighters being detained (see for instance right here and right here). When a pro-IS group in Darzab district (Jawzjan) was defeated by the Taleban in July and August 2018, their Central Asian members chose to surrender to the federal government (AAN reporting here); in accordance with native sources, nevertheless, they weren’t detained, but built-in into native anti-Taleban rebellion forces. That is one other hazard for the post-agreement interval, that demobilised fighters (of any stripe or nationality) be a part of militia forces.

Future anti-terrorism cooperation?

The US has repeatedly provided to proceed supporting Afghanistan in what it calls ‘counter-terrorism efforts’. There are a number of ideas which have transpired from statements of US authorities and army officers as well as from assume tanks papers. This might embrace an agreement to offer access to Afghan army bases; continued training and knowledge sharing and; an concept of a “residual force” (made in 2014), which as Brookings wryly observed would nominally  “protect the U.S. embassy, which—wink, wink, with the Taliban’s permission—will have the capacity to conduct limited counterterrorism strikes.”

There are not any stories of whether or not any of this has been discussed with the Taleban. Their place is obvious: they are not looking for a single overseas soldier to remain on Afghan soil. This has been repeatedly said, for instance by the top of their delegation in the February 2019 Moscow meeting: “This war will continue until and unless foreign soldiers [do not] exist in Afghanistan” and by their former chief negotiator Sher Muhammad Abbas Stanakzai in a media interview at the similar event: “We will not tolerate a single American soldier in our country.” This may be interpreted as a ‘no’ to any future US bases in Afghanistan. This might require the nullification of the 2014 Safety and Defence Cooperation Settlement with the US (previously often known as the Bilateral Safety Agreement or BSA) that regulates the current standing of the US troops in Afghanistan. It is unclear whether or not the Taleban would comply with any future limited usage rights of Afghan bases for US troops in the context of counter-terrorism cooperation within the means of the negotiations. It might assist that, as may be assumed, a future settlement won’t be absolutely public however embrace secret annexes.

Despite the hurdles lined up beneath a) to c) and the shortage of progress on points quantity three and 4 of Khalilzad’s agenda – a ceasefire and the involvement of the Afghan authorities within the peace talks–, Secretary Pompeo introduced a new, two months timeline throughout his current brief stay in Kabul: “I hope we have a peace deal before Sept. 1, that’s certainly our mission set.” This is able to be still before the Afghan elections later that month.

Moscow: Disappointments

Before the newest Moscow Afghan dialogue meeting in Might 2019, Russia’s particular envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, had left its actual format open. He advised TASS company, it was unclear whether or not it “will be negotiations or just a discussion on how to establish peace in Afghanistan.” He added “We invited both the Taliban and Afghan politicians to attend a solemn meeting dedicated to 100 years of diplomatic relations. They have the right and desire to communicate after that, and they will have such an opportunity.” (three) This drew a line between day one, the Russian-organised meeting, when Taleban and Afghan government representatives sat in the same room and the Taleban introduced a statement that did contact upon the peace challenge, and the assembly on day two. The Afghan authorities representatives (head of the High Peace Council Abdul Karim Khalili and the Afghan ambassador) have been excluded on the insistence of the Taleban and the rest of the Kabul delegates decided to satisfy the Taleban anyway.

The joint communiqué worked out by the Taleban and the ‘delegation from Kabul’ (minus the government representatives) was relatively bland, reflecting the Kabulis’ disappointment concerning the Taleban rejection of an Eid ceasefire. It stated the meeting had been “productive and constructive” and additional:

Each side mentioned the continuation of intra-Afghan talks, ceasefire, the discharge of prisoners, safety of civilians, overseas troop withdrawal, end of the “foreigners’ interference” [quotation marks in the original], the perseverance of national sovereignty, and ladies rights…

But there were some far more constructive reactions. Din Muhammad Hanif from the Taleban delegation and a member of the movement’s Leadership Council stated he was glad and that each one members “had consensus on bringing peace, foreigner forces withdrawal, and consolidation of Islamic system in Afghanistan.” Ex-president Hamed Karzai even enthusiastically talked of a “very nice, very very positive meeting,” saying “[w]e are leaving very very happy” with “some progress, some spectacular progress on some issues.” He even used the Taleban’s terminology, speaking about “put[ting] an end to the current occupation.” Neither the Taleban nor Karzai, though, referred to the meeting on day one with the government representatives present.

In the eyes of one of the Kabul delegates, former deputy Chief Government of the Afghan authorities, Muhammad Mohaqeq, (four) the three-day meetings did not constitute negotiations but. He stated (quoted right here), “Our position is that the Taliban must engage in intra-Afghan talks. So far, we did not have negotiations; it was only an intra-Afghan dialogue.”

Mohaqeq’s position echoed that of the Afghan government after its officials have been edged out of these conferences. See the joint US-Afghan assertion after Ghani met Khalilzad in Kabul in June 2019 which stated that they agreed that “preparations for intra-Afghan negotiations“ – as opposed to an intra-Afghan dialogue – “now [are] essential.”

The Afghan government worries will not be shocking. After years of assurances by their worldwide allies that peace talks can be “Afghan-owned and Afghan-led,” understood to mean by the federal government in Kabul, the fact that the Taleban are meeting non-government, Kabul-based politicians in worldwide fora has created deep frustration in the presidential palace. In addition to being excluded from the Doha talks, the Russian government didn’t invite representatives of the federal government in Kabul to the November 2018 Afghanistan convention in Moscow (a media report right here) and handled them as ‘one faction among many’ through the February and Might 2019 meetings. An try and deliver the two sides to at least one desk in Doha failed in April 2019; because the UN Particular Representative to Afghanistan put it in his current report to the Safety Council: it “unravelled amid disputes over the list of participants.”

A duel over legitimacy

The so-far unbroken Taleban insistence on retaining the Afghan government out of the Doha negotiations and the intra-Afghan dialogue, in addition to the federal government’s makes an attempt to get access to each, are a wrestle for legitimacy. Each side claim to characterize your complete Afghan nation and deny that the opposite one does.

In this duel, the Taleban have clearly been allowed to made positive aspects at Kabul’s bills and do now seem to take pleasure in an equal relationship in negotiations with the US, who they see as their major adversary. This has been bolstered by their intelligent use of the media. In the November 2018 assembly in Moscow, they appeared in front of worldwide TV cameras for the first time because the ‘peace process’ started (there had been interviews on Afghan media earlier), and in Might 2019 they brought their deputy Mullah Baradar, lately freed after ten years in Pakistani custody (Baradar was a close assured of Taleban founding father, the late Mullah Muhammad Omar), AAN analyses right here and here). That once more secured them the limelight.

Past public relations points, the Taleban’s strategy is to disclaim the Afghan authorities legitimacy, together with that gained by way of the ballot box. The Taleban delegation’s spokesman, for example, said after the newest Moscow assembly: “We oppose the [planned presidential] election, because a real, transparent election cannot be held under occupation. (…) We want our country first to be liberated and then the Afghan people will decide its future.”

Afghan elections can indeed be stated to have been marred and not solely by large fraud and irregularities and regular delays; their inclusiveness has additionally been hampered by threats from the Taleban. Even so, the participation of voters continues to be excessive once they can get to the polls, typically braving security threats. This means that elections are necessary to Afghans. Furthermore, election outcomes (even when externally mediated as in the 2014 presidential election) are accepted internationally and – even when typically grudgingly – domestically. Furthermore, in contrast to the government, the Taleban have by no means put themselves to any type of vote; their rule in areas they management seems quite to be based mostly on a mixture of army energy and coercion and some native consent (see AAN’s “One Land, Two Rules” collection, newest half here). It’s also value mentioning that, though their Moscow assertion may sound as if the Taleban usually are not towards elections in precept, there has been no sign up any of their statements, or from practical coverage, to indicate that they contemplate elections a suitable means of choosing a government  (see an AAN evaluation of this situation here).

A second-term gained by means of the ballot field by the Ghani administration would reinforce its standing and perception that it is the only official consultant of the Afghan individuals and ought to be main any talks with the Taleban. The same can be the case ought to one other candidate win. Although the Taleban have show themselves prepared to take a seat with government officials and opposition politicians there ‘as individuals’ around one table in the Moscow conferences, this may change after the September 2019 election which may have been, in their view, held beneath an ‘occupation’ which means any winners shall be tainted in their view.

US-Afghan bilateral relations disaster…

US-Afghan relations have suffered appreciable strains over the interval from late 2018 to early 2019. This was first because of US officials, among them Khalilzad, stating in meetings with diplomats in Kabul, that the government in Kabul, and never the Taleban, was the “biggest obstacle for peace.” These quotes shortly made the rounds in Kabul and angered the government. It was picked up by president Ghani’s opponents resembling his former national security advisor Hanif Atmar, who will run in the upcoming presidential election, who was quoted as calling the government “not only illegitimate (…) but also an enemy of peace” as just lately as on 25 June.

Adding to the anger was strain from Washington to additional delay the Afghan presidential elections, in an try to offer envoy Khalilzad a “bigger window to seek a deal” with the Taleban while the government has been hoping to bolster its standing by profitable elections before peace talks. The thought of the delay was, as US officers informed the Wall Road Journal, “raised by U.S. special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad in talks with various stakeholders and intermediaries.” Also, a number of Afghan politicians against President Ghani referred to as peace ‘more important’ than the election, for instance, former president Karzai and former finance minister Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi.

In the long run, the election, originally scheduled for April 2019, was postponed, in late December 2018,  to 20 July 2019 – after which once more to 28 September 2019. The primary delay already handed the opposition a means to assault the incumbent as can be, in their view, illegally staying in energy after his term ran out in Might 2019 (AAN evaluation here and here).

Reuters reported on 27 March “current and former U.S. officials tell Reuters they believe Ghani is positioning himself to perhaps be a spoiler in still-fragile negotiations, angry that the Afghan government has been kept out of talks and worried about the implications for his presidency.” As a outcome, the Afghan authorities assumed that the strain and the accusations had been a cause why it remained excluded from the negotiations in Doha (and in addition largely from the Moscow conferences).

Tensions between Kabul and Washington developed in an environment where many Afghans – in authorities and out of doors of it – feared that the US was mainly fascinated with pulling its troops out shortly relatively than in a real peace settlement (see for instance this text by the Chairman of the Unbiased Administrative Reform and Civil Service Fee Nader Nadery) or that the withdrawal might happen before there was a clear agreement on how Afghanistan’s post-withdrawal political system can be organised. Without such an settlement, they worry, the doorways can be open for a Taleban takeover; they might simply be waiting for all overseas troops to have left.

This once more is especially based mostly on US President Donald Trump’s well-known antipathy to the US involvement in Afghanistan usually (AAN analysis right here) and his tendency to take selections without consulting even close advisors. Trump had solely given Khalilzad, it was understood (see AAN evaluation here), a brief window to return to an settlement with the Taleban. It’s also assumed that Trump does not let Khalilzad know what his considering is on Afghanistan; James Dobbins, the previous US envoy to Afghanistan who led the US delegation on the 2001 Bonn conference, wrote earlier this yr: “I don’t think [Khalilzad] knows what Trump’s going to do.”Trump reiterated his position in a current interview with Time magazine, saying concerning the ‘Middle East’ basically (through which he appeared to include Afghanistan) that, “We should have never been there, and I’d like to get out.” But aside from that, there have been at the least no apparent signs of imminent impatience about Afghanistan or Khalilzad’s efforts.

The US strain and accusations played into both the Taleban and Ghani’s home rivals’ arms as it introduced the federal government as the primary scapegoat for the shortage of a remaining agreement.

In a sharp response, Afghan National Safety Adviser, Hamdullah Moheb, slammed Khalilzad in mid-March 2019 for “delegitimizing the Afghan government and weakening it” and doubtless even planning to turn out to be the “viceroy” (a nickname Khalilzad carries since his first post-2001 stint in Afghanistan, see right here) in a “caretaker government,” a reference to a scheme promoted by some Afghan politicians including former president Karzai. (There had been earlier accusations in 2009 of Khalilzad, who’s Afghan-American, wanting himself to turn out to be Afghan president after a pro-Khalilzad marketing campaign was organised in Afghanistan, with workplaces opened in his identify and conferences held by supporters – read for instance right here; it was denied by Khalilzad.) (5)The State Division in Washington ordered US officials to haven’t any additional contact with Moheb, and the US delegation walked out the subsequent day of a meeting in the presidential palace where Ghani and Moheb have been each current. This order still seems to be intact.

… and makes an attempt to mend the fence

Each the US and the Afghan governments have taken steps to beat the bilateral tensions and tone down their controversy. The environment has improved again, a minimum of in public.

Overseas Secretary Pompeo, on his current stop-over in Kabul, underscored Khalilzad’s technique in the talks on the interconnectedness of the four issues mentioned. The objective of intra-Afghan negotiations which should “begin as soon as possible” (ie they’re totally different from the intra-Afghan dialogue in Moscow), he stated, was “for Afghans to agree on a timeline and a political roadmap for reaching a comprehensive peace agreement.” This makes clear that the US sees such an intra-Afghan agreement as a prerequisite for the conclusion of the great ultimate agreement. He additionally stated “the government but also representatives from opposition parties, civil society, including women and youth“ must be part of the “large table” of the intra-Afghan negotiations.

Pompeo underlined “we hold detailed discussions with the Government of Afghanistan in parallel with our talks with the Taliban” and that the US work “diligently to ensure that we are fully aligned in our approach. (…) We are not and will not negotiate with the Taliban on behalf of the government or people of Afghanistan.”

A number of days earlier than, Khalilzad had already addressed Afghan fears about a fast fix with a collection of tweets on 18 June that acquired broad consideration in media: “we seek a comprehensive peace agreement, NOT a withdrawal agreement” (capitalisation in the unique). Alice G Wells, Senior Bureau Official for South and Central Asian Affairs, stated before a US Congress subcommittee on 13 June 2019 that the US, other donors and the World Bank have been working “to develop a post-settlement economic action plan that will help Afghanistan navigate what could be a difficult economic period.” Khalilzad informed an Afghan media outlet: “There is a need for help, we are ready to continue our support to Afghanistan.”

President Ghani before emphasised the great coordination with Washington. He stated on the current Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s summit in Kyrgyzstan’s capital Bishkek on 14 June 2019: “We consider the US commitment to a political solution to be credible.” A number of days earlier he said that there was a “regular and continuous information sharing process” between the US and Afghanistan. And Khalilzad, throughout his June tour via the region, made positive he talked with Ghani, other main Afghan politicians and civil society representatives.

What next?

Aside from the approaching new Doha spherical, a new spherical of intra-Afghan dialogue is scheduled for 6-7 July 2019 in Doha. Participation of presidency officers seemed to be confirmed at a current UN Security Council meeting about Afghanistan in New York, when the US representative explicitly welcomed those efforts and added that the US “also is laying the ground for intra-Afghan talks to begin for agreeing on a timeline and political road map for a peace agreement.”

Nevertheless, it isn’t clear whether the Taleban have accepted the participation of government representatives. There seemed to have been agreement on that earlier than the April meeting in Doha (which then broke down over the extreme measurement of the 120-member delegation from Kabul.) Afghanistan’s Second Vice President Sarwar Danesh, nevertheless, said on 19 June, the identical day as the UN assembly, that the Taleban have not given any green mild yet for the intra-Afghan dialogue.


That the attempts to end the Afghan conflict are hitting obstacles on the best way should surprise nobody. Diplomacy, as a German politician once stated, “is drilling slowly through thick planks of wood.” The obstacles spring from a complicated political and diplomatic surroundings, with a number of Afghan, regional and international pursuits, and home policy issues in Afghanistan and the US.

To start with, nobody knows what President Trump may determine to do at any time limit. This is what the Taleban, with their blocking of any Afghan authorities involvement in Doha, seem to hope for, that the US president pulls troops and funding, and the nation falls back into their palms, as a financially-deprived government in Kabul disintegrates. Historical past has an example for that: Then Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s cease of monetary, economic and army help for then President Najibullah’s authorities in 1992 led to government collapse and – by the best way – main realignments inside Afghanistan. That historical past repeats itself in such a method is possible, but also needs to not be taken as a right, as circumstances have changed. This consists of the hardening of enmities between lots of Afghanistan’s political and army factions, based mostly on a lot of extra spilled blood, and that the nation is extra militarised than ever earlier than. Vital Afghan anti-Taleban military-political forces may have the opportunity and prepared to struggle it out. Nevertheless, a new spherical of factional conflict can be catastrophic for the Afghan population.

On the Afghan aspect, the government’s issues with its legitimacy has undermined its place in the three-parties constellation with the Taleban and the US. The shortage of a united ‘national’ technique for negotiations and of a unified negotiating group has allowed the Taleban to look united and well-organised as compared. Authorities and opposition politicians haven’t rallied round within the face of the Taleban and US negotiating their nation’s future. Nor has the federal government been capable of insist on its right to be within the lead on negotiations with the Taleban. Ghani’s try and bolster his legitimacy earlier than the election by holding the Consultative Peace Loya Jirga and attaining a nationwide consensus about peace talks in Might 2019 have been undermined by an opposition boycott. As AAN wrote it was “difficult to see how this Jirga will strengthen the hand of the Palace vis-à-vis the United States or of Afghans supporting the 2001 settlement against the insurgents.”

Yet it’s still the Taleban’s refusal to barter with the Afghan government that makes the Taleban the most important present impediment to peace. This additionally stands in the best way of further progress of their negotiations with the US. That is additionally an unsustainable place in the eyes of many Afghans who, notably as voters, are uninterested in conflict and nonetheless see the current political set-up extra favourable then a regime that includes the Taleban. The Taleban’s refusal to speak to the government additionally defeats their makes an attempt to present themselves as the ‘real voice’ of the Afghan individuals.

This refusal additionally conceals conceptual shortages on their half. There has been little element emerging through the years on how the Taleban imagine a future political system in Afghanistan – solely a want for vaguely-formulated ‘reforms’ of the current structure, claims that they do not purpose at a “monopoly of power”, and that they need “that all Afghans shall genuinely see themselves represented in the government.”Their conceptual shortcomings are notably egregious in terms of the ‘how’ of their undertaking. Their statements in Moscow and elsewhere appear to indicate that they envisage the power-sharing that might be the possible consequence of a peace settlement purely as an ‘inter-factional’ deal, or as authorities figures joining an Emirate government. The Taleban have additionally given no indicators that they might comply with any post-agreement political system in Afghanistan being legitimised by a basic election. As an earlier AAN analysis of their statements has shown, their considering quite appears to point to a shura-ye hal o aqd, an Islamic form of illustration by way of choice, not election, as a technique of gauging public opinion. (6) This may be a major retreat from the present political actuality in Afghanistan, regardless of all its shortcomings.

On the similar time, the Afghan authorities and the US have not come ahead with concepts about how the Taleban would turn into part of the longer term political set-up, particularly given the little inclination proven by the Taleban to turn out to be just one other political get together standing for a widespread vote. The federal government has signalled that it is able to talk about a revision of the current structure. That is the cause for widespread fears in Afghanistan that a peace deal may end with compromising primary political rights.

In this state of affairs, it is constructive that Washington and Kabul try to restore their relationship and have started consulting each other once more. Additionally it is constructive that Washington is sending alerts that Doha is about a peace agreement and never only about withdrawal, and that there are efforts to set up a ‘post-peace agreement’ plan (the financing and implementing of which can be troublesome sufficient, also given the expertise of the unfinished post-2001 DDR/DIAG course of) (an AAN report right here).

It is key that the US persist with the ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ method; anything would end in a deal over the heads of the Afghan government and population. Given the Taleban-created obstacles, it stays to be seen which arguments – and probably concessions – the US needs to make use of to inject a new dynamic into the seventh spherical of negotiations in Doha, now that it has made clear there shall be no agreement without the Afghan government and other forces in the current Afghan political setup.

Nevertheless, Pompeo’s newest timeline seems to be far too brief for a comprehensive agreement being hammered out in all detail. It might already border on a miracle if the divergent Afghan teams – Afghan government, opposition, civil society and Taleban – might come to a full agreement over the way forward for their nation within two months. This might be the case even when most of the teams and individuals concerned have been truly talking to one another or weren’t set to election campaign mode.

Edited by Rachel Reid, Sayed Reza Kazemi and Kate Clark

(1) There had been rumours earlier than Eid that the Taleban may observe an undeclared ceasefire over the Islamic holidays, reported for example by the top of the personal 1TV channel, Abdullah Khenjani, on social media. With regard to the Eid days, a spokesman for the AfghanMinistry of Interiorclaimed that government forces had foiled 35 assaults in Kabul during those days “including a car bombing plot”. However these claims are troublesome to confirm, and it was additionally not clear whether or not, for example, this included plans by ISKP who didn’t comply with the ceasefire of 2018.

(2) The article linked here offers a record (which does not embrace the Taleban but some teams which are a part of this movement) and does not identify all of them persistently:

The terrorist teams that battle in Afghanistan embrace:

•      Haqqani Community: This group has bases in North Waziristan and in accordance with security departments, the group has close relations with Pakistan army.

•      Al-Qaeda Community: Studies point out that this network has bases in Pakistan and have been finishing up terrorist actions in the japanese and south-eastern part of Afghanistan.

•      Daesh [Islamic State Khorasan Provinve, ISKP]: Daesh, the most recent group, is rising into a huge menace towards Afghanistan. It has carried out a lot of the deadly assaults within the nation. Reviews say Daesh training facilities are situated in Pakistan.

•      Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: Coaching facilities of this group are situated in Waziristan in Pakistan. The group has carried out deadly assaults towards Shia Individuals in Afghanistan.

•      Lashkar-e-Taiba: This terrorist group has been finishing up terrorist assaults in Afghanistan and India. The group has carried many deadly attacks in Afghanistan thus far.

•      Jaish-e-Mohammad: This terrorist group also has been finishing up terrorist assaults towards Afghan individuals and Afghan individuals.

•      Mujahidin United Council (Shura-i-Etehad Mujahidin): Bases and training middle of this terrorist group additionally situated in Waziristan in Pakistan.

•      Maulvi Nazir Group: This terrorist group’s coaching centers are situated in South Waziristan.

•      Te[h]rik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP): TTP is the terrorist group that Pakistan claims the group management is situated in Afghanistan, but stories say the group’s bases and coaching centers are situated in South Waziristan.

•      Amre Ba Maroof and Momin group are other groups which were launching terrorist assaults towards Afghanistan.

There are different Paksitani [sic] terrorist teams, akin to Jamat ud Dawah, Lashkar-e-Islam, Ansarul Islam and Islamic Jihad Motion which were finishing up assaults towards Afghanistan.

Chechens, Uighur terrorist group, Tajiks, Tehrik-[i Islami-ye] Uzbekistan [IMU] and Arabs are the Middle East terrorist teams which were lively towards Afghan authorities for many years.

One other listing of terrorist organisations allegedly lively in Afghanistan based mostly on info by the US army within the nation might be found in: Anthony H Cordesman, A Conflict in Disaster! Afghanistan in Mid-2019, June 2019, p 65:

Estimates of Terrorist Group Drive Measurement

Terrorist Group Estimated – Number of Fighters:

ISIS-Okay – 3,000-5,000

Haqqani Community – 3,000-5,000
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan – 3,000-5,000
Islamic Emirate High Council [Taleban splinter in western Afghanistan] – 1,000

al Qaeda – 300
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan – 300

Lashkar-e Tayyiba – 300
Tariq Qidar Group – 100-300
Jamaat ul-Ahrar – 200
Japanese Turkistan Islamic Motion – 100

Islamic Jihad Union – 25
Jamaat Dawa Quran – 25

No Credible Info Obtainable for the Following Terrorist Teams:

Iranian Revolutionary Guard-Quds Pressure
Hizbul Mujahidin
Commander Nazir Group

Harakat-ul Jihad Islami/Bangladesh Lashkar-I Jhangvi
Harakat-ul Mujahidin
Jaish-e- Mohammad

Supply: USFOR-A

(3) The members have been: for the Taleban, a 14-strong delegation attended led by the top of their Political Fee and one of the three deputy heads of the motion, Mullah Abdul Ghani Achund, better referred to as Mullah Baradar (all names right here). From Kabul, 20 politicians attended (see here and right here), including former president Hamed Karzai; ex-provincial governor and chief Atta Mohammad Nur; former national safety advisor and presidential candidate Hanif Atmar; former overseas minister Zalmay Rassul, also a presidential candidate for 2019; Yunos Qanuni, one other leading Jamiati and Atmar’s vice presidential operating mate; Muhammad Mohaqeq, Atmar’s other operating mate; Rangin Dadfar Spanta, one other former overseas minister; the Afghan ambassador to Pakistan and former finance minister Omar Zakhilwal;former deputy overseas minister and assume tank head Hekmat Khalil Karzai; a deputy chief of the Jombesh social gathering, Abdullah Qarluq; former mujahedin leader Hamed Gailani; and two ladies, Fawzia Kufi and Tajwar Kakar. Furthermore, Muhammad Karim Khalili, the top of the Afghanistan’s High Peace Council (HPC) was invited; the HPC just isn’t recognised – because its members are appointed by the federal government’ – by the Taleban; at the similar time, Khalili has joined the opposition towards President Ghani. Additionally, the Afghan ambassador to Moscow, Latif Bahand, attended the assembly on the primary day.

(four) Mohaqeq has fallen out with President Ashraf Ghani who sacked him from his place in January 2019 after he joined an ‘opposition’ ticket for the September 2019 presidential election.

(5) Khalilzad had denied this personally, see quoted within the Israeli every day Ha’aretz (18 March 2009):

When asked about rumors that he might run for a president of Afghanistan, Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad bursts into laughter. (…)  “I thought that the previous rumors were of me becoming an Emperor of Iraq,” he says, sitting in his new workplace at the Middle for Strategic & Worldwide Research (CSIS), where he holds position as counselor.

“This concept keeps popping up. I have a delicate spot for Afghanistan, because I was born there and spent my childhood there, but I’m not operating for president of Afghanistan.

(not online; within the writer’s archive).

(6) See also this quote of a former Taleban minister at present concerned within the negotiation effort, from the Borhan Osman and Anand Gopal 2017 paper, Taliban Views on a Future State:

Stating that “The Emirate is based on the election by handpicked figures, such as the ulama and tribal elders,” and that “Obviously, the laymen cannot make a perfect choice” in elections, the previous minister suggests a “middle way” between the present “presidential republic system […] based on the election by an individual electorate on a grass-roots level” and the Emirate:

The center approach shall be to go for a system based mostly on an election during which the strange individuals elect their district councils which can, in turn, elect a parliament, which can elect the chief for the country.